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Abstract 
The proposition of free trade has been one of the most important tenets of economists for the past two centuries. 
They have been of the view that free trade will be in benefit of nations in most of the cases. But “new trade 
theory” and “infant industry argument” does not support this principle of trade. Therefore now economists are 
trying to seek out not only economic rather political determinants of protection in nations. So this study has 
basically tried to see how government maximizes welfare of the society in designing trade policies specifically in 
developing countries. Moreover the whole developing region has been divided regime wise, domestic 
institutional wise and  income wise. Both quantitative and qaualitative analysis has been performed. Grossman 
Helpman model has been employed for estimating these welfare estimates. Time span of the study is from 1995-
2010. And GTAP7 has been used for extracting data for intermediate inputs. Welfare mindedness has been 
calculated with lobby and without lobby formation in an economy. Results are very much close to the present 
world scenario that more rich and democratic nations are more welfare concerned than poor and autocratic 
nations. More over parliamentary democracies proved more welfare oriented than presidential democracies. 
 
1: Introduction 
 
Most of the time it has been observed that trade policies are quite different from being optimal policy. Many a 
times trade policies have been considered as an instrument of redistribution of incomes to favored groups. 
Majority voting model and different lobbying models have tried to explain these notions. But still different 
aspects need to be focused like why such policy shift is bias towards import-competing lobbies? One of the 
reasons explained by Grossman and Helpman(1994) is this, the decision taken for efficient redistributive policy 
intensify the process of lobby making by special interest groups for getting maximum benefit from such policies 
which leads to considerable waste of resources. Welfare mindedness is actually the rate at which the 
governments trade off between welfare of masses and different pressure groups for distortioanry trade policies. 
Many times such lobbies tie themselves with the govt. for diverting the resource allocation towards inefficient 
use1. 
The proposition of free trade has been one of the most important tenets of economists for the past two centuries. 
They have been of the view that free trade will be in benefit of nations in most of the cases. But “new trade 
theory2” and “infant industry argument” does not support this principle of trade. Therefore now economists are 
trying to seek out not only economic rather political determinants of protection in nations. Factors like level of 
employment in the industry, import penetration rates, concentration of industries (Rodrick 1994) have been used 
by many authors to know the determinants regarding imposition of tariff in reality but no clear results have been 
found.3 Moreover few economists suggest that political economic models related to trade policy should focus on 
these important elements like; structure of levels of protection, instruments of protection, changes in the structure 
of levels of protection overtime and changes in the overall level of protection overtime (Krueger 1994). Recently 
more emphasis by political economists has been given upon the first element regarding the protection policy 
(Hillman 1989, Rodrick 1994).  Second issue is also important that why few nations choose one instrument for 
protecting their own industry while it demands other nation not to use the same one just to get more benefits by 
using its influence.4 Not much work has been done in this regard but still Hillman (1990) and Feenstra and Lewis 
(1991) can be viewed in this regard. Many of the times it has been assumed that the structure of level of 
                                                 
1
 See Mitra(2005), “The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Theory and Applications toLatin America” 
2
 New Trade Theory proposed that intervention in trade like import duties, export taxes, import subsidy and export subsidy, 
can be used to enhance the economic welfare of the nations on the basis of scales of production. And new entrants in 
industries can have more economic profits or rents as compared to the late comers. 
3
 See Krueger 1993 for the failure of the US protection structure with any of the political economic model. 
4
 For example in past we have seen US negotiating voluntary export restraints with Japan on many products rather than itself 
imposing import quotas which creates a price difference between two nations. 
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protection is time invariant. But in reality it has also been observed that if an industry gets successful in 
achieving a level of protection then it can easily raise or increase it overtime and it becomes all political matter. 
Finally regarding the determinants of level of protection, many research has been conducted on the basis of 
many propositions but still gaps are here which are needed to be filled. 
Different approaches for political economy of trade policy: 
1. Tariff Formation Approach_____Findlay and Wellsiz(1982) 
2. Political Support Function Approach: An extension of former approach _______ Rodrick(1995) 
3. The Median Voter Approach ________ Mayer (1994) 
4. The Compaign Contribution Approach: An extension of H-O model_______ Magee, Brock and 
Young(1989) 
5. The Political Contribution Approach ________ Grossman & Helpman (1994). 
Tariff Formation Approach: Findlay and Wellsiz(1982): This approach helps us to determine tariff 
endogenously using general equilibrium model. It sheds light on how interest groups effect in tariff 
determination process. This model assumes political institutions as given. Despite all such there is something 
important was missing that is it failed to explain the policy maker’s objective function explicitly.  
Political Support Function Approach: Rodrick(1995): This approach is basically an extension of the former 
one. In this model a policy maker explicitly maximizes his welfare function. And he incorporates in his function 
the gains from protection and losses to the population. This model recommends that positive tariff rate is an 
optimal policy. Another advantage of this model is thais that it can easily be applied in an open economy. This 
theory rejects that interests groups can have any role in policy making.  
The Median Voter Approach: Mayer (1994): This model incorporates the political and economic forces into 
the determination of protection policy. This model accepts the influence of interest groups in trade policy making 
decisions through majority voting. According to Mayer, every political decision is the result of the interaction of 
few players in an economy; self-interest voters, lobbying groups, politicians, and preferences of policy makers 
related to trade. The model also proposes that optimal tariff rate is associated with the factor endowment level 
with an individual. Moreover this approach decides that in the situation of diversification in the economic 
interests of voters for endowments of factor (labour and capital), tariff policy will be decided through majority 
voting system. And equilibrium tariff rate will be that one which will remain unchanged with any pressure from 
majority of voters. And this model concludes that optimal tariff rate depends upon the relationship between 
individual’s  capital-labor and society’ endowment. No doubt this is an advancement in the theories of political 
economy models of trade policy determination but still critics5 have raised objections behind its rationale. They 
have regarded this theory as a theory of majoritarian politics not of interest groups politics.  
The Campaign Contribution Approach: Magee, Brock and Young(1989): This is an extension of H-O model 
by including two lobbies and two political parties along with two factors, and two goods in the determination 
process of trade policy. And this model explicitly explain the role political parties in decision making process. 
Magee et all and Grossman-Helpman have contributed in this regard. The difference between these two 
approaches is quite obvious. In first approach lobbies through political campaign influence the chances of 
election of a particular party while in the second approach lobbies through political campaign of a certain 
candidate tries to influence the trade policy of ruling party in government. Moreover all players (lobbies, 
political parties and voters) maximize their welfare. One political party is assumed to be pro-protection and the 
other pro-trade. Moreover it is also being assumed by authors that capital-intensive sector is pro-trade and 
demands for export subsidies because this will increase the return to capital as proposed by Stopler-Sameulson 
Theorem. While labor-intensive sector lobbies for import tariffs and is said to be pro-protection.  
The Political Contribution Approach: Grossman & Helpman (1994): This model considers a small open 
economy and does not allow for competition among political parties. It assumes only the role of a single political 
party which is in rule and faces many lobbies interests. Each lobby represents a single industry’s interest. The 
main purpose of government is to maximize weighted sum of aggregate social welfare and contributions made 
by lobbies for their particular interests.  
Theoretical Framework: 
In principle, there must be four elements in the political economy model of trade policy which are as follow6: 
 
                                                 
5
 See Reizman and Wilson(1995) 
6
 Rodrick, “Political Economy Of Trade Policy”  
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So from this framework it is cleared that an economic outcome is the result of consensus between lobbies which 
are also known as special interest groups and political institutions working in an economy. In other words it can 
be interpreted as follows7: 
 
After reviewing all this now we develop a theoretical framework for our research work. As it has been discussed 
above that the purpose of this study is to see that how trade policy decisions are formulated in developing 
countries. Which players forces the politicians to take decisions, whether small but strong domestic lobbies or 
majority of voters. Moreover how institutions differ from democratic political regime to non-democratic regimes 
and through which mechanism these help in decision making processes. Whenever we talk of a policy making 
process, there are mainly three actors who play their role in modifying policies according to their interests.i.e. 
Interest groups, Political parties and Bureaucrats(policy makers). The system works in this way: interest groups 
provide electoral support to political parties and these parties provide political support to bureaucracy. Here 
bureaucracy refers to specialized organization composed of highly trained professionals8. After this political 
parties extract benefits from these bureaucrats in the form of low regulations and special favors for domestic 
lobbies which help these parties to get reelected. So in this way special interests are protected by making 
legislation and institutions for personal motives not taking into account the common majority interests. 
Polk (2002) summarized all different approaches used to incorporate the effects of interest groups. He talked 
about common agency approach and then about signaling model. He tried to show how such lobbying affects the 
political decision making process. he analyzed that common agency models takes politics as a market and 
folding the individual preferences, politicians deviate from the objective of maximization of social welfare. In 
this model politicians use  compaign contributions as a payment for buying policies. While the other channel of 
interest groups take politicians self-interested. And in this model, effect of lobbying has also been taken positive 
in a way that politicians have asymmetric information but lobbyist being fully informed about the preferences of 
individuals help these politicians to make right policy decisions. So in this way lobbying can be regarded ad 
welfare-enhancing here but welfare-reducing in the former case where contributions are used to deviate 
politicians from the right decision making.  
Van Winden(2002) tried to analyze interest group activities and their influence on politicians and their policy 
outcomes. He observed that interest groups affects policies in two ways. Directly and indirectly. Directly in a 
way to influence the behavior of policymakers and indirectly through affecting voters. Moreover he tried to 
separate the influence of interest groups through different means like lobbying, pressures, structural coercion, 
and representations of interest groups among policymakers through social ties. And also threw light on several 
channels of this influence. For example, they may approach to bureaucrats 9 , lagislators 10  and political 
                                                 
7
 Acemoglu (2011) 
8
 Jhonson . M. P, “A Glossary Of Political Economy Terms” 
9
 see e.g. Spiller (1990), Laffont and Tirole (1991), and Banks and Weingast (1992). 
10
 See Austen-Smith (1993), Dharmapala (1999a, b) 
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candidates.11 Many studies also tried to see the impact of interaction between legislator and bureaucrats when 
both can be influenced by interst groups through contributions. Some authors12 consider that the interst groups 
make it their “targets” to influence the interaction between state and local governments.  
Merlo and Felli(2000) found that lobbying always matter. Which means that lobbying always affects the 
decision making process in democracies. Moreover they also concluded that policy outcome is robust even to the 
changes in the electoral rule. They also endogenized lobby activities in their model. Similarly Reuben(2002) also 
discussed the importance of such pressure groups and concluded that interest groups are now an important 
characteristic of any political system. because such groups make payment to policymakers for shaping policies in 
their interests. 
2.Literature Review 
“Perhaps no other area of economics displays such a gap between what policy makers practice and what 
economists preach as does international trade.” — Dani Rodrik (1995). 
 
Lots of literature is available for, how trade policy preferences are made  in an economy. Rodrick has pointed out 
that there must be four elements in the framework of trade policy formulation and individual preferences lead the 
policy maker to make some decision. But to know what actually individual preferences are, is difficult to 
estimate. Some are of the view that factor specificity determines the individual policy preference. While some 
are relating it directly to the institution building. Here is a brief review of past literature which will be helpful in 
reaching some conclusion that what is actually needed in deciding a good policy for an economy. There are 
different determinants of trade policy.  Different economic models incorporate either factor endowment or 
product characteristics for trade policy preferences. Whenever people want to take any decision about trade 
policy they keep in mind the distributional aspects in terms of incomes from certain decisions. Here in this study 
not only typical thinking has been adopted for reaching at optimal trade policy rather institutional aspect has 
been tried to take into consideration using Grossman Helpman model. That’s why this literature review helps in 
knowing so far done works regarding this specific political economy model.  
Bhagwati(1982) proposed the idea of Efficient Tariff which the government has to impose for providing 
protection to labour in import-competing industries. Govt. has to take this step to reduce the amount of lobbying. 
The other way to satisfy labourerss are to provide them subsidies or to bribe them but due to budget constraints it 
becomes difficult for governments to adopt this way. So the compensation through the generation of revenues 
from protection becomes more feasible.  
Helpman(1995) presented for the first time the relationship between international politics and internal politics 
role in the formation of trade policies. He explained all the different approaches of trade policy formation from 
tariff formation function to the influence driven contributions. But along with he discussed a new concept of the 
formation of free trade areas in trade policy and tried to find its effect on the overall welfare of an economy. 
Helpman showed his concern about this new version due to the reason that trade policy in one nation is effected 
by the political environment of the other. International political arena play a vital role with the help of diplomacy 
to effect tariff rates and restrict the entry of many other nations to enter into their markets. He also emphasized 
the that such a framework is needed that incorporates role of institutions in the formation process of trade 
matters.  
Golberg and Maggi (1999) are the pioneers in employing Grossman Helpman(1994) model for testing 
empirically the decision making process of trade policy. They found that govt. put high weights on social welfare 
of the society than to the compaign contributions while setting the trade policies. They proved it through their 
results that this weightage is 50-70% higher for social welfare maximization as compared to the political 
contributions of worth $1 spending by the govt.  
Mitra(1999) also added his contribution in the literature of lobby formation within  the framework of political 
economy of  trade policy. He highlighted a notion that more unequal distribution of assets leads to large numbers 
of lobbies in an economy. This study also incorporates the role of endogenous lobbies in to the model presented 
by Grossman Helpman. Moreover author also explains the nature of industry whether organized or not by 
looking at its capital stock and elasticity of demand for its product. Industries that are having high capital stock 
and inelastic demand are said to be organized and vice versa. 
Bandyopadhyay (2000) also proved the same notion using the application of Grossman Helpman model that 
govt. puts thousand times high weights for the maximization of social welfare as compared to campaign 
contributions. He used non tariff barriers data for US fo the year 1983.  
Scheve and Slaughter(2001) proved that low skilled labour demands more protection than highly skilled labour 
in case of United States and but people engaged in those industries which are related to trade sector, are not 
                                                 
11
 See Hillman and Ursprung (1988), Hillman (1989) 
12
 Hoyt and Toma (1989) 
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showing strong  support for  trade barriers. Moreover the author also found that factor incomes and asset 
ownership also help to shape the policy preferences. But the main result of their findings showed that individual 
preferences are more related to the factor type endowment rather than the industry of their employment. 
Eicher and Osang (2002) using a dataset of 106 industries of US tried to make the comparison of two 
endogenous models of trade policy determination. One is political support function model(Hillman) and the 
other is influence driven function(Grossman-Helpman). They found that the latter model outperforms the first 
one in explaining the role of lobbies in shaping up the policies in economies. they employed instrumental 
variable approach using Tobit model. For political support function model, they tried to find the elasticity of 
substitutions for profits of lobbies and the social welfare and none of both showed any significant values of 
estimates. But even then it can be generalized that from the results that this model places high weights for social 
welfare.while on the other hand dataset confirms strogly and significantly prove the predictions for influence 
driven approach give by Grossman-Helpman. And proved that import penetration has a strong positive effect on 
the tariff barriers and negative effect on non-tariff barriers for organized industries. Here they used a threshold 
approach regarding the contributions level for regarding an industry as an organized one. Overall their findings 
confirmed the superiority of influence driven models on political support models in explaining the role of lobbies 
in determining the policy outcome and confirmed the earlier findings that govt. aims to be welfare maximizing in 
policy making. 
Kaempfer, Tower and Willet(2002) using non-technical approach and reviewing some theoretical and past 
empirical analysis concluded his analysis that protectionism is the outcome of self-serving special interests in the 
society. It can be regarded as a costly product of a negative sum political game rather than the product of the 
govt. which aims at the maximizing welfare of the society bringing into focus on the tradeoff in between equity 
or efficiency.  
Dutt and Mitra(2002) found that political ideology of the govt. in power also affect the trade policy decision. 
They used Heckscher-Ohlin framework for measuring this relationship and observed that left wing party support 
more protectionist policies in capital nations and suggest more pro trade  policy in labor abundant nations. And 
they also described that such behavior is strongly being observed in case of democracies than in dictatorships. 
Milner and Kabuta(2004) tried to relate the nature of political system to the choice of trade policy. i.e. either 
more free trade or protected one. Using five different proxies for trade policies as dependent variable, an 
econometric analysis for large number of developing nations had been applied. They found that more democratic 
nations tend to have less trade barriers. Using the datset from 1970-99, they observed that in labour abundant 
nations, political leaders demand low trade barriers as the degree of democracy increases.  
Frye and Mansfield (2003) have tried to examine the institutional variations on trade policy with special 
reference to the post-communist world. They used a panel data of 25 nations from 1990-98 and observed that 
democracies are having more inclination towards liberal trade policies while on the other hand non-democratic 
nation favour protectionism. Moreover they also found that in both types of regimes when power is being 
dispersed from protectionist elites, it creates a poltical space for interest groups in making such economic policy 
making process and who give much favour to liberal trade policy. Supporting the findings of other studies for 
different regions, they suggested that domestic political actors and institutions play an important role in opening 
up trade policies. And when political fregmentation was observed in communist nations, then such dispersion of 
power lead to more open commercial policies which were not based on the vested interests on few elites as it 
was before. 
Cadot, De Melo & Olarreaga(2004) also made the use of the model presented by Grossman and Helpman to 
show that how tariff patterns are determined in rich and poor countries. He also pointed out a very important 
phenomenon that equilibrium level of protection is not just effected by the lobbies which are benefitted by this 
rate of protection but also from the counter lobbies effect which are negatively effected by this rate of protection. 
He used the extension of the basic model to show all this. Moreover he found that rate of protection is high in 
poor countries for revenue constraints. And poor countries protect more to the agriculture sector while the rich 
do opposite. Overall in his study he tried to find that a good policy may not be the result of politicians objective 
functions rather may be due to the removal of conflicts in different interest groups in a society.  
Afontsev(2004) during his project for Russia for the policy of unification of tariff found that citizen welfare 
were given higher weight in government priority than contributions of lobbies. It means that in formulating trade 
policy the lobbies do not have leding role in Russia. The author also made the use of extended Grossman 
Helpman model to find the effects of a trade policy on different players in the economy: producers and 
importers.   From the results of standard and extended model, it was observed that the coefficients attached to the 
political economy priorities are almost same. However to increase the budget revenue and welfare of citizens 
were having relatively higher weights as compared to lobbies welfare. For identifying between organized and 
unorganized industries, threshold criterion was used .i.e. number of firms in industry does not exceed a certain 
level.   
Developing Country Studies                                                                                                                                                              www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol.3, No.13, 2013 
 
81 
 
Belfrage(2004) also tested extended Grossman Helpman model used by Goldberg and Maggi(1999) for a 
number of OECD countries and regions and observed that special interests in the context of trade policy 
decisions vary positively with the change in protection rates of the industries. Their findings are in line with the 
predictions of the model. Moreover this study also incorporated the effect of terms of trade into the model and 
found that such concerns are having more importance for larger nation in the sample while the downstream 
interest effect has not been observed for any nation.  
McCalman(2004) using the model of protection for sale given by Grossman Helpman for Austaralian economy 
tried to prove the structural parameters causing trade liberalization in that nation. And he observed that 
alongwith the weights assigned by govt. to different welfare aspects, size of the voting lobbies also matters for 
such transitional change in trade policies. Which means that the protection of any industry is related to its voting 
strength. Moreover this study also showed that about 40 times weights are higher for social welfare than on 
political contributions. Two stage least square model had been used because of the endogenity problem in both 
variables i.e. inverse penetration ratio and tariff on intermediate inputs in determining the trade policy and trade 
volumes.  
Mobarak & Purbasari (2005) found that personal relations with politicians can be helpful in influencing the 
policy outcomes from governments, which in other words means that if lobbies and pressure groups are 
connected with some political parties then their chances to win policy are brighter as compared to other sectors 
in the economy. They also employed Grossman-Helpman model of protection for sale on the data of Indonesian 
economy. Moreover this study used not only tariff barriers data rather non-tariff measures have also been used. 
And it is being observed using dat for 20,000 manufacturing firms that politicians are more willing to use import 
licenses to facilitate than other trade measures. And politicians try to focus on individual level protection not on 
the whole industry wise.  
Michalek and Hagemejer (2006) used Grossman-Helpman (G-H) framework of Protection for sale for 
analyzing the role of lobbies in designing trade policy of Poland. They found that such lobbies try to affect the 
decision making ability of Polish government through the provision of contributions in political process. 
Advanced econometric technique.i.e. Instrumental variable (IV) approach, has been applied for controlling 
endogenity of trade policy. The data employed confirmed the predictions of this model and showed that 
organized sectors have the advantage of influencing the decisions of governments in their favours. Various 
proxies have been used for observing whether sectors are organized or not. Moreover the variable used for trade 
policy MFN tariff rate proved a much better proxy than preferential tariff levels.  
Blonigen(2008) found recently evidence for the trade policy preferences of people. The author tried to fill the 
gap in the models of political economy of trade policy which is related to their individual preferences for a 
particular policy action. 
He found that uninformed people do not know on the basis of facts that which policy should be favored. Because 
information acquisition is costly. And these uninformed are those who have less income and education. So 
author highlighted in his study that in the political economy models, economists should also incorporate such 
factors which shows the preferences of people in the determination of trade policy. Moreover he also found that 
life cycle change also affects the policy decisions. For example after retirement people don’t get much informed 
about the situations of present issues because information getting process becomes complex for them and 
therefore decisions will not be based on accurate estimates.  
Gwande, Krishna and Olarreaga(2008) studied the formulation of trade policy in the context of govt. welfare 
mindedness of the govt. by using Grossman Helpman model. They studied the govt. behavior variation for fifty 
nations they used the structural approach for finding the impact of political, economic and institutional variables 
on the decision making process of tarde policy. They observed that the govts in which political institutions have 
more check and balances prove to be more welfare minded. Moreover they found that more informed voters  and 
high degree of urbanization also cause to put more weight on the social welfare. They also suggested that this 
welfare mindedness is the major cause of tarde liberalization.  
Tang (2009) also used extended version of Grossman Helpman model of protection for sale for examining the 
effect of political idealogy of countries in determining trade policies. His study showed that left wing 
government are pro- labour almost every where and that’s why demand high rates of protection in labour-
intensive industries and vice versa. He incorporated factor intensity variable alongwith ideology variable and 
then observed how left wing and right wing govts. effect the protection decision in labour intensive and capital 
intensive industries. Dummy variable was being generated for ideology using dataset DPI and factor intensities 
have been calculated for US industries  and on the assumption of constant returns to scale, these have been used 
even for all nations in the study. The author has employed  non- tariff barriers as dependent variable in 
Grossman Helpman model. 
Gwande and Magee(2010) Tried to incorporate the effect of free riding problem in Grossman Helpman 
model.and found some different results as compared to earlier studies. They used largest firm’s share of industry 
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output for capturing the effect of this new variable. They found that by introducing this variable, the weights on 
social welfare reduces and increases for compaign contributions. Moreover they showed that with free riding the 
protection rates will be lower even when policy makers value both social welfare and political contributions. 
Under free riding, there appears the problem of absence of perfect cooperation among firms. Due to this reason 
industry’s contributions reduces comparing to the perfectly organized environment. The authors concluded that 
this phenomenon cause the protection rates of developed nations very low despite the quite active role of their 
politicians. 
Gawande, Krishna, Olarreaga (2011) showed that many political, economic and institutional factors help 
governments in taking decision making for the welfare maximization of people. They conclded that due to 
redistributive effects of trade policy, it can be regarded as a best tool to evaluate the government welfare 
concerns. They made use of Grossman Helpman model for measuring the welfare maximizing behavior of fifty 
nations and found that if political institutions are having  more check and balances in the economy then 
govverments will be welfare minded. Similarly if voters in a economy are more informed then governments put 
more weights for social welfare. While on the other side if voters are showing their concerns towards a specific 
idealogy of a political party and media is also influencing their opinions then the objective of social welfare 
maximization will not achieved and governments will not be proved welfare minded.  
Hicks, Milner & Tingley (2014) have also tried to analyze the role of political parties and their special interests 
in shaping up of the trade policies in developing nations. They discussed the case of costa Ricans for observing 
their bahaviour towards an international trade agreement CAFTA. They suggested that in developing theories 
related to trade policies, a special focus should be made on top-down political factors  which includes political 
actors elites in the society along with many other economic variables. Bottom-up factors which are related to 
redistributive effects of trade policies seem to have very little importance.  
3. Model: 
In this section, theory has been developed that how governments show their welfare concerns for their citizens 
relative to private benefits. For this purpose Grossman Helpman  (1994) model has been used. This model 
provides strong theoretical basis for understanding the behavior of governments in assigning weights to either 
welfare of the societies or to the political contributions of special interest groups. This is basically political 
economy model which helps in knowing how decision making process of governments is affected by political 
actors and economic players in an economy. These political actors are political parties and interest groups and 
economic players are policy makers who make the policies supported by organized lobbies in the society. For 
example an organized lobby will always demand high rate of protection and will try to get political support. So 
that such lobbies may convince policy makers through bureaucracy for making policies in their favour. First 
empirical test of this model was made by Goldberg and Maggi(1999) for US economy. The data verified all the 
assumptions of the model because US is the only nation in which the data related to expenses on political 
contributions is easily available which helps the authors in knowing which sector is organized and non-
organised. The sectors with more political contribution represents organized lobbies and vice versa. The model is 
as follows: 
Consider a small open economy. There are n+1 tradable sectors. Identitical preferences are being assumed for all 
individuals. Their preferences are represented by this utility function: 
U= z0 + Ʃ ui (zi)   (1) 
In equation (1), z0 is a numeraire good and has been produced using labour alone and under constant returns to 
scale.  Wage rate is being assumed w=1 under perfect competition. Moreover  price of this good has been 
normalized to one. And zi is non-numeraire good. i= 1….n, whose production function is given by: 
xi = fi(Ki, Li) 
here Ki is sector specific input used in the production of this good, Li shows units of labor employed in the 
production of this non-numeraire good. And again production process is assumed to be constant returns to scale 
subject to diminishing returns against each factor of production.  
Consumer surplus is given by: 
S(pi)= u(d(pi) ) – pid(pi)  
and aggregate form is  
S(p)= Ʃ(ud(pi) – pid(pi)) 
Here d(pi) is the demand fuction for good i.  
The indirect utility function for individual k will be as follows: 
vk = yk + Ʃsik(Pi)  
yk is the income of the individual.  
Moreover numeraire good has been assumed to be produced under constant returns to scale and with labour 
factor of production. Wages are fixed at one. The remaining n goods are produced using labour and sector 
specific inputs under constant returns to scale of technology. The supply of sector specific input is limited and 
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that’s why rents are earned for these. Returns of each specific factor i are determined by the prices of good i and 
denoted by ψ(pi).  
Supply function for good i will be written as follows:  
Yi(pi) = ψ׳(pi) 
So from above discussion it can be observed that the owner of specific factor input has chances to increase its 
rents through the price of the good in which that input has been used. Therefore it can be concluded that such 
owners of specific inputs may try to influence government policy decisions in a way to raise the prices of goods 
in which these are being used. For this purpose, governments make the use of different qualitative and 
quantitative measures of protection which help the domestic producers or producers of import competing 
industries to save them from foreign competition through increasing their domestic prices. Tariff is one of those 
measures and an important tool of trade policy. The world price of each good is assumed to be given. therefore 
the domestic price after providing protection to domestic is given as: pi= p0+ tis, where p0 is world price and tis is 
specific import tariff by the government create a gap between the two prices. i.e. world price and domestic price. 
It is also being assumed that the revenue generated through tariff will be distributed equally in society.  
Earlier the indirect utility function of a single individual k has been stated. If we sum up indirect utility functions 
of all individuals then we arrive at aggregate welfare of the society. So it means it can be generalized that 
aggregate welfare is the function of domestic prices. Similarly returns to labour, specific input factors and tariff 
revenue gives us aggregate income.  Keeping in view all this information, now we can calculate aggregate 
welfare denoted by W as follows: 
 
W=  L +  Ʃ ψi(pi) + Ʃ tis Mi(pi) + Ʃ si(pi) 
Where i= 1…..n 
Import function can be written as: 
Mi= di-yi 
Now the next important question arises about the role of lobbies which can influence in determination of tariff. It 
is being assumed in the model that large proportion of the population of country is represented by organized 
lobbies. In GH(1999) model, important motive of lobbies is to maximize their rents from specific factor input. 
Formally the objective function can be stated as: 
Wi= ψi(pi) 
Basically this objective function of Grossman Helpman model is the summation of two factors. Either to 
maximize social welfare or political contributions of special interest groups which are also called lobbies. These 
lobbyists use political contributions for their different self motivated interests. i.e. to finance re-election 
campaigns and make such expenditures which can be helpful in purchasing government favors for their personal 
interests. Thus the complete government objective function can be written as: 
G= aW + C  
         =aW + ƩCi 
here i Є L (lobbies) 
“a” is the weight assigned by governments to the welfare of its citizen. Lobbies political contributions to 
government are represented by Ci. And these lobbies try to maximize this objective function: 
Wi- Ci 
Grossman Helpman(1999) determines the equilibrium tariff through “manu auction” model but here in this study 
equilibrium tariffs are set fixed through Nash bargaining game. This also maximize the government objective 
function. i.e. joint surplus of political contributions by lobbies and welfare function of the governments. Joint 
surplus can be written as:  
Φ= aW+ ƩWi 
Now this equation is showing that all sectors are politically organized which is frequently observed in 
industrial/adveanced/developed countries in case of manufacturing sector. As in case of political action 
committees (US) and industry associations (Europe), special interest groups lobby their governments through 
reporting their expenditures to above mentioned bodies. But in other countries of the world, as it has been 
observed so far that no such records of political contributions exists and that’s why difficult to decide about 
organized and non-organised sectors. So the assumption that all sectors are organized even in developing nation 
can also be considered valid because that this analysis has been made at the aggregation level of 20 ISIC 2-digit 
industries. And this classification includes those industries which are organized in US and almost anywhere in 
across the world. Therefore on the basis of these two  assumptions i.e Nash eqiuilibrium game and politically 
organized sectors, now joint surplus function will be written as: 
Φ = L + Ʃ[a+1] ψi + Ʃ a (tis Mi + si) 
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Differrentiating above equation with respect to  tis  which shows tariff on good i is equivalent to differentiating 
the same equation with respect to price of good i (pi) in which that specific input factor has been used. The 
derivative of profit function is as follows:  
ψ׳(pi)= Xi (output of good i) 
and derivative of consumer surplus is : 
si׳(pi)= di (demand for good i) 
so by putting these values in the first order condition of joint surplus function is : 
[a+1]Xi + a [-di+ tis Mi׳(pi) + Mi] = 0                       
Where  i= 1…….n 
Solving this equation for t, we get equilibrium tariff that maximixes welfare and political contributions by 
lobbies.  
 ti/1+ti = 1/a[ (Xi/Mi) /ei]                         (A) 
where i= 1……..n 
here  
ti = (pi – pi0)/ pi0 is advalorem tariff for good i. 
pi = the domestic price of good i and pi0 is the world price.  
Xi/Mi = the inverse import penetration ratio.  
ei = the absolute import demand elasticity.  
Xi which shows industry output tell us about rents occurred from protection. And Mi (imports) captures the 
welfare losses due to protection. In Grossman Helpman model, major determinants of trade policy are elasticity 
and import penetration ratio. If goods are having lower demand elasticity, higher will be the tariff rate or level of 
protection. And higher tariff rate leads to smaller imports. In this way producers buy protection for their benefits.  
The above equation can be written as:  
(ti/1+ti). ei .(Mi/Xi) = 1/a    (B) 
Where i= 1…….n 
Stochastic version has been used in this study for estimating parameter “a”. So the econometric model used in 
the study is: 
(tit/ 1+tit). ei. (Mit / Xit) = α0 + εit                     (C) 
Where i= 1………..n 
If the role of intermediate inputs has been incorporated in the same model than the equation ( C) will be changed 
into the following expression13: 
(tit/ 1+tit). ei. (Mit / Xit – ) = β0 + εit        (D) 
Here φijyj term has been extracted from Input-Output tables which shows the part of intermediate input into final 
product.              
Error term has been assumed to be identically independent and normally distributed for all countries with 
homoscedastic variance σ2. In the original version of GH model, there appears the problem of endogeniety to 
tariff related to imports, output and elasticity of demand but after assuming that all sectors are politically 
organized, this problem has been overcome by taking inverse import penetration ratio and elasticity to the left 
side of the equation. In the final equation,  α0 shows welfare mindedness of governments in each nation. So we 
can write it as:  
α0= β0= 1/a 
 Now this stochastic version of model has been estimated for 56 developing nations. The reason of missing other 
developing nations is the unavailability of data for many variables especially output data. In previous studies 
authors have taken a mix of both developed and developing countries 14for estimating this model in the context 
of political economy of trade policy. This is for the first time that a large and maximum number of developing 
countries have been used for estimation purpose. Further these developing nations have been divided into two 
sub categories.i.e. Politically free nations(democratic nations) and politically not-free nations(Autocratic 
nations). More over welfare mindedness has also been analyzed through the political systems in these 
economies. whether presidential or parliamentary system promotes welfare related to trade policy. Because such 
decisions vary according to the change in political regimes. 
4: Objective of the study: 
• To see whether developing governments are welfare oriented or not. 
• To examine quantitatively the role of their trade policies like non-discriminately tariffs on aggregate 
welfare of the society.  
                                                 
13
 Full derivation is available on request from author. 
14
 See  k. Gawande (2009) & Gawande. Krishna and olarreaga(2011) 
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• To observe qualitatively the role of political regimes of these nations, their different political 
institutions and income status in determining the welfare concerns of their governments. 
• To analyze the effect of vertical integration among various sectors effect on the welfare mindedness of 
governments. 
5: Hypothesis: 
H1: Developing nations are welfare maximizing. α0 ≠ 0 
H2: Democratic developing nations are concerned more to the welfare of society in making trade    
      policy decision than autocratic developing nations.  
H3: Vertical integration/linkages effects negatively the aggregate welfare of the society. β0 ˂ 0 
H4: Nations having lower tariff rate are having high estimates of welfare.   
 
6: Variables and Data Sources: 
Variables used in this study are: 
1. Tariff 
2. Industry output 
3. Elasticity 
4. Input-Output data 
For each nation data has been collected across 20 ISIC 2digit industries. For the first time this 2 digit 
classification has been employed in literature. The reason of less number of industries is the non availability of 
dataset either for industrial output or tariff. Time span used in this study is 1995-2010.  
• Tariff Data: Non-discriminatory(MFN) tariff rate have been used for each nation. Data has been 
extracted from United nation’s database TRAINS.  
• Industry Output: Output data has been taken from the UNIDO’s INDSTAT using two-digit 
classification and revision 3. International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) level of aggregation 
of output has been used. The purpose of using this classification is this, it is quite extensive in 
explaining the nature of association between industrial organizations and political setups in different 
industries and countries. Basically the record of political contributions in a nation tells about either 
industry is organized. Except U.S, no other nation has such records so to avoid this problem those 
industries have been chosen which are being run through government support. So in this case all such 
industries will be considered as politically organized because these are following government rules and 
regulations. 
• Elasticity: Import demand elasticities have been  estimated for each nation  at the six-digit HS  level 
using a revenue function approach by Kee et al. (2008). Those nation for which sufficient data is not 
available for estimating elasticities, for such nations the industry averages of the elasticity estimates of 
all other nations have been used15. 
• Input-Output (I-O) data: GTAP 7 has been used in this empirical work. It is covering 57 sectors and 
113 regions overall. But the number of sectoral coverage is not same for all nations. Many nations have 
been included for this first time in this dataset. That is also one of the reasons that the number of sectors 
chosen in this study are confined to 20. Reference year of this database is 2004.   
7: Sample Development: 
All developing countries according to the definition of World Bank have been selected. These were 126 total in 
number. But only those nations have been included into the analysis for which trade related data and political 
data was available. All these nations have been converted into two panels.  
i) Free Nations. 
ii) Not-Free Nations. 
This categorization has been made on the basis of available source “The Freedom in the World Survey”. This 
survey has been conducted since 1972. It is comprised of two important categories. A) Political Rights, b) Civil 
Liberties. Here Political right means how much people are free to join political parties, compete for public office, 
having the right to vote freely for potential candidates who have in real sense influential in making public 
policies. While on the other hand civil liberty means here freedom of expression, prevelance of rule of law, 
personal autonomy and economic freedom without any interference from state. The standards used by this 
survey are based on the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This survey  takes into account 
every aspect of an economy whether governmental or non- governmental which can affect economic freedom. 
So it tries to measure freedom in its real sense through practices not only practiced by laws. Rating process of 
this survey includes both analytical reports and numerical ratings. The survey is containing 25 questions. 10 
question measuring political rights and 15 civil liberties. The topics of these questions include independence of 
                                                 
15
 Same practice has been done in recent study by  Gawande. Krishna and olarreaga(2011) 
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media, religious freedom, corruption, the rights of the political parties to function, independence of the judicial 
system and women’s right. All countries are assigned numerical values from scale 1-7. 1 shows highest level of 
freedom and 7 shows the lowest level. Moreover both these indicators of freedom are being averaged to see the 
status of a nation whether Free, Partially Free, or Not-Free. Countries rating between 1- 2.5 are Free, nations 
with rating 3-5 are patially free and those having scores between 5.5-7 are not-Free. But in this study the 
catogary of Partially Free nation has been merged in Free and Not-Free nations in such a way that scores of both 
freedoms have been averaged and a nation having score less than equal to 7 will come under Free nation heading 
and the nations having score greater than 7 are being ranked as Not- Free. More over this status has been 
observed individually in each year since 1995. And a country which has observed in a large number of times any 
of these two status since 1995-2010 then nation will be awarded that status for overall ranking. In notation we 
can write the rule followed in this study to make panel of world developing nations as follows: 
Ʃ(PR+CL)/2 ≤ 3.5  Democratic Nation 
Ʃ(PR+CL)/2 > 3.5  Autocratic Nation 
So in this way category of partially free nations has been merged in two broad categories.i.e. Free or Not free 
nations. Moreover Free nations have been considered as democratic nations where everyone has maximum 
political and civil liberty and vice versa.  
Similarly the distinction among nations on the basis their institutions whether parliamentary or presidential has 
been made using Database of Political Institutions 2012(DPI). As the time span of the study is from 1995-2010, 
so taking this time limit as a threshold for deciding whether a nation has been parliamentary or presidential. For 
the maximum number of years a nation has been in any category, it has been its status. For example, if for 
maximum number of years a nation has been having a parliamentary system during a specified time limit, then it 
will be considered as a nation having parliamentary system and vice versa.  
Moreover the status of being poor and rich nation has also been decided taking into consideration World Bank 
data source. Per capita income has been used to decide this status. But the nations with high income and upper 
middle income has been awarded the status of rich and nations with low income and lower middle income has 
been considered as poor nations.  
8: Methodology: 
Empirical results given above are based on the cross sectional ordinary least  estimation of equation (C) and (D). 
The data has been pooled for each nation across industries and over time period. Following Gawande, Krishna 
and Olarreaga(2011), data has been stacked across 56 developing nations and parameter a  has been determined 
as  a co-efficient on the dummies16 for nations used in study. This equation gives directly country-specific 
parameter a which measures the welfaremindedness of nations’ government in the sample. These estimates of 
parameter a can also be obtained as the simple averages of the expression on left hand side. The estimation of 
both equations gives very reliable and unbiased results w.r.t endogenity as compared to earlier existing literature 
because in this equation on the right hand side, only constant term is there. Problem of endogenity occurs when 
Xi/Mi ratio remains on the right hand side because to some extent tarrif rates or trade policies are endogenous to 
imports and output.  
Moreover Grossman Helpman (1996) model has assumed that parameter a is constant across industries but not 
across countries. Due to this reason, industry or time fixed effects is not in line with already built theory. This in 
turn try to highlight this fact that in applying panel models, within and between(it implies taking the average of 
each industry across time) estimates should give the same magnitudes of point estimates as derived from pooled 
OLS estimation in balanced panel. Moreover the panel fixed effect model actually measures the overall averages 
of industry effects across time which corresponds to the left hand side calculation of equation (C) and (D). As 
the panel used in this study is unbalanced that’s why a little discrepancy remains between these two point 
estimates obtained either fixed effect model or pooled OLS. Table given below gives the results of OLS and then 
the resulting estimates of state’s welfare concern.  
                                                 
16
 See “Interpreting the Intercept in the Fixed Effects Model”, Stata Journal. 
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9: Results: 
Table: Welfare estimates without lobby formation and with lobby formation 
Country Constant Welfare mindedness  
(α0) 
Constant Welfare mindedness(β0) Regime Type of system Status 
Argentina 0.3562 
(0.0371)  
[9.5867] 
2.8071 -0.0071 
0.0006 
-10.3899 
-140.845 Dem Presid Rich 
Armenia 0.7193 
(0.2477) 
[2.9031] 
1.3901 
 
0.0173 
0.1855 
1.0601 
57.8034^ Auto Presid Poor 
Azerbaijan 0.6386 
(0.1419) 
[4.4979] 
1.5658 
 
-0.4006 
0.2486 
-1.6112 
-2.4963 Auto Presid Rich 
Bangladesh 2.6220 
(0.5461) 
[4.8007] 
0.3813 
 
-4.9987 
3.0838 
-1.6209 
-0.2000 Dem Parliament Poor 
Bolivia 5.9416 
(1.7716) 
[3.3537] 
0.1683 
 
-1.1852 
0.2188 
-5.4156 
-0.8437 Dem Presid Poor 
Brazil 0.1480 
(0.0344) 
[4.3007] 
6.7536 -12.7918 
2.7857 
-4.5919 
-0.0781 Dem Presid Rich 
Bulgaria 0.5938 
(0.1831) 
[3.2427] 
1.6840 0.3481 
0.1829 
[1.9027] 
2.8727 Dem Parliament Rich 
Cameroon 0.2680 
(0.0655) 
[4.0909] 
3.7302 
 
-0.4355 
0.1495 
-2.9119 
-2.2962 Auto Presid Poor 
Chile 0.9790 
(0.4004) 
[2.4448] 
1.0213 
 
-4.8438 
1.1269 
-4.2981 
-0.2064 Dem Presid Rich 
China 0.1225 
(0.0464) 
[2.6366] 
8.1616 
 
-51.2467 
15.2825 
-3.3532 
-0.0195 Auto Assembly-
Elected President 
rich 
Colombia 0.2231 
(0.0288) 
[7.7408] 
4.4810 -5.5408 
1.0058 
-5.5085 
-0.1804 Auto Presid Rich 
Costa rica 1.2018 
(0.1921) 
[6.2558] 
0.8320 
 
13.5458^ 
14.1837 
0.9550 
0.0738 Dem Presid Rich 
Ecuador 9.2565 
(3.2478) 
[2.8500] 
0.1080 
 
5.0066 
2.6636 
[1.8796] 
0.1809 Dem Presid Rich 
Egypt 0.1971 
(0.0575) 
[3.4287] 
 
5.0719 
 
0.1388^ 
0.1186 
1.1702 
 
7.2046 Auto Presid Rich 
Ethopia 27.9513 
(21.7173) 
[1.2870] 
0.0357^ 
 
-0.9332 
0.2842 
-3.2834 
-1.0715 Auto Parliament Poor 
Guatemala 0.2317 
(0.0727) 
[3.1850] 
4.3151 
 
-5.0374 
0.8575 
-5.8744 
-0.1985 Auto Presid Poor 
India 0.1205 
(0.0403) 
[2.9832] 
8.2981 -80.4642 
49.7818 
-1.6163 
-0.0124 Dem Parliament Poor 
Indonesia 1.6957 
(0.8715) 
[1.9457] 
0.5897 
 
5555.568 
1014.141 
5.4781 
0.0017 Dem Presid Poor 
Iran  0.1119 
(0.0510) 
[2.1934] 
8.9328 
 
0.1152 
0.0448 
2.5684 
8.5005 Auto Presid Rich 
Jordan 0.6444 
(0.0900) 
[7.1543] 
1.5515 
 
-0.2145^ 
0.4146 
-0.5173 
-4.6620^ Auto Presid Rich 
Kazakistan 0.1320 
(0.0517) 
7.5736 
 
-1.1250 
0.4545 
-0.8888 Auto Presid Rich 
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[2.5505] -2.4749 
Kenya 0.2523 
(0.0418) 
[6.0251] 
3.9625 
 
-0.8894 
0.3110 
-2.8596 
-1.1243 Auto Presid Poor 
Korea 0.1599 
(0.0678) 
[2.3570] 
6.2538 
 
-23.8928 
5.0882 
-4.6957 
-0.0418 Auto Presid Rich 
Kyrgistan 0.7032 
(0.1522) 
[4.6191] 
1.4220 
 
-0.5341 
0.2267 
-2.3552 
-1.8723 Auto Presid Poor 
Lativia 0.2205 
(0.0614) 
[3.5857] 
4.5350 
 
-0.1130^ 
0.1903 
-0.5938 
-8.8495^ Demo Paliament rich 
Madgascar 0.3974 
(0.2135) 
[1.8607] 
2.5162 
 
-0.6924 
0.1268 
-5.4597 
-1.4442 Dem Presid Poor 
Malawi 0.4115 
(0.1721) 
[2.3902] 
2.4297 
 
-14.7962 
3.0530 
-4.8464 
-0.0675 Dem Presid Poor 
Malaysia 0.1284 
(0.0622) 
[2.0633] 
7.7857 
 
-3.1650 
1.6330 
-1.9380 
-0.3159 Dem Parliament Rich 
Mongolia 115.5596 
(105.343) 
[1.0969] 
0.0086^ 
 
 
0.0137^ 
0.1052 
0.1303^ 
72.9927^ Dem Presid Poor 
Mauritius 0.3538 
(0.0418) 
[8.4477] 
2.8262 
 
-13.0890 
3.4629 
-3.7797 
-0.0764 Dem Parliament Rich 
Mexico 1.0721 
(0.1406) 
[7.6247] 
0.9327 
 
-1141.763 
203.9139 
-5.5992 
-0.0008 Dem Presid Rich 
Morocco 0.3894 
(0.0549) 
[7.0846] 
2.5674 
 
-0.9678 
(0.5740) 
[-1.6858] 
-1.0332 Auto Presid Poor 
Nepal 0.9767 
(0.3417) 
[2.8581] 
1.0237 
 
-121.8753 
77.3559 
-1.5755 
-0.0082 Auto Parliament Poor 
Oman  6.3322 
(4.1884) 
[1.5118] 
0.1579^ 
 
-3.3280 
1.3924 
-2.3900 
-0.3004 Auto Presid Rich 
Pakistan 0.1251 
(0.0204) 
[6.1201] 
7.9893 
 
-3.0030 
(0.8166) 
[-3.6772] 
-0.333 Auto Presid Poor 
Panama 0.9990 
(0.3898) 
[2.5625] 
1.001 
 
-2.0541 
(0.4251) 
[-4.8310] 
-0.4868 Dem Presid Rich 
Peru 1.4557 
(1.2726) 
[1.1438] 
0.6869^ 
 
-3.7790 
(0.6134) 
[-6.1607] 
-0.2646 Dem Presid Rich 
Philipine 0.1466 
(0.0305) 
[4.8012] 
6.8195 
 
-16.8216 
(2.5720) 
[-6.5402] 
-0.0594 Dem Presid Poor 
Poland 0.2404 
(0.0255) 
[9.4219] 
4.1589 
 
0.1854 
(0.0171) 
[10.8116] 
5.3937 Dem Presid Rich 
Qatar 15.8635 
(9.2671) 
[1.7118] 
0.0630 
 
-8.6422 
4.9906 
[-1.7316] 
-0.1157 Auto Presid Rich 
Romania 0.2917 
(0.0437) 
[6.6671] 
3.4276 
 
0.2096 
0.0325 
6.4442 
4.7709 Dem Parliament Rich 
Russia 0.1116 
(0.0518) 
[2.1517] 
8.9564 
 
-48.6191 
11.7806 
-4.1270 
-0.0205 Auto Presid Rich 
Saudi Arabia 1.3220 
(0.7115) 
[1.8580] 
0.7564 
 
-40.8415 
7.1193 
-5.7366 
-0.0244 Auto Presid Rich 
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Senegal 9.9671 
(9.7190) 
[1.0255] 
0.1003^ 
 
-1.4754 
0.3016 
-4.8908 
-0.6777 Dem Presid Poor 
Singapore 0.0000 Infinity 0.0000 Infinity Dem Parliament Rich 
South Africa 0.1196 
(0.0530) 
[2.2566] 
8.3545 
 
-3.2452 
0.7357 
-4.4105 
-0.3081 Dem Assembly-
Elected President 
Rich 
Srilanka 1.2549 
(1.0575) 
[1.1866] 
0.7968^ 
 
-3.5901 
1.3903 
-2.5821 
-0.2785 Dem Presid Poor 
Thialand 0.1721 
(0.0722) 
[2.3828] 
5.8078 
 
-24.7011 
(3.8450) 
[-6.4241] 
-0.0404 Dem Parliament Rich 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
0.7968 
(0.7968) 
[3.5616] 
1.2549 
 
-0.8490^ 
(0.9761) 
[-0.8698] 
-1.1778^ Dem Parliament Rich 
Tunesia 0.1138 
(0.0476) 
[2.3899] 
8.7847 
 
-1.0674 
0.3754 
-2.8431 
-0.9368 Auto Presid Rich 
Turkey 0.1677 
(0.0397) 
[4.2234] 
5.9596 
 
-25.2551 
(4.9436) 
[-5.1086] 
-0.0395 Dem Parliament Rich 
Ukrain 0.1230 
(0.0392) 
[3.1352] 
8.1238 
 
-2.5048 
0.7261 
-3.4496 
-0.3992 Dem Presid Poor 
Uruguay 0.4724 
(0.0776) 
[6.0871] 
2.1164 
 
-0.5638^ 
0.4462 
-1.2636 
-1.7736^ Dem Presid Rich 
Veitnam 0.6745 
(0.2080) 
[3.2423] 
1.4824 
 
-9.4709 
2.4695 
-3.8351 
-0.1055 Dem Assembly-
Elected President 
Poor 
Venezuala 0.2432 
(0.0849) 
[2.8638] 
4.1114 
 
-10.9332 
(1.3669) 
[-7.9985] 
-0.0914 Dem Presid Rich 
Yemen 7.1541 
(4.5089) 
[1.5866] 
0.1397^ 
 
-1.5700^ 
1.1879 
-1.3216 
-0.6369^ Auto Assembly-
Elected President 
Poor 
() shows standard errors and [] shows t-statistics. 
^ shows insignificant value. 
‘dem’ stands for democracy, ‘auto’ stands for autocracy, ‘presid’ stands for presidential system amd ‘parliament’ 
stands for parliamentary system.  
 
Table: Overall panel Results 
Overall panels Constant Welfare mindedness 
Whole developing nations 
panel 
3.6758 
(1.5423) 
[2.3833] 
0.2724(significant) 
Democratic developing 
nations 
2.4836 
[1.1769] 
(2.11) 
0.4032(significant) 
Autocartic nations 2.4248^ 
[1.7403] 
(1.39) 
(insignificant) 
() shows standard errors and [] shows t-statistics. 
^ shows insignificant value. 
 
10: Conclusion: 
The above table shows the extent how much developing nations are welfare concerned over policy formation. 
This is for the first time that such a broad analysis covering maximum developing nations17. Model has also been 
extended for downstream producers who make the use of one sector’s output as an intermediate input in their 
final product. Role of such downstream producers has been incorporated because of the reason that such 
                                                 
17
 Only those nations have been dropped for which data was  not  sufficiently available.  
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producers pressurize the government to reduce protection rates upon these intermediate products. This act of 
theirs form a lobby to influence the policy decision of the government. No doubt such lobby formation leads to 
lower tariff rates for some sectors but ignoring many others. So without keeping this fact in mind one should not 
conclude that such distortionary effect on policy by such lobbies can be helpful in raising welfare mindedness of 
government.   
All the nations included in the panel have been divided into two categories based on regime differences i.e. 
democratic and autocratic nations. This is important point to be focused in the study. Because this study intends 
to see whether political regimes matter in decision making process or not. Moreover, division of nations has also 
been made on the basis of different political systems/or domestic institutions 18  like either nations having 
parliamentary system are more welfare oriented or nations with presidential system are more involved in the 
policy formation which is concerned with betterment of masses. Furthermore, for measuring welfare mindedness 
of governments, their income levels have also been taken into consideration under two broad category based on 
regimes. Like nations have been partitioned into two groups as well. i.e rich democracy/autocracy or poor 
democracy/autocracy. Estimation has been done  individual country wise and broad category wise as well.  As 
the null hypothesis states that nations are welfare oriented if parameter value is not equal to and greater than 
zero. And values large in magnitude shows more welfare mindedness of governments and vice versa. From the 
results it can be seen that for overall panel of developing countries this value of parameter is not very large 
showing that governments of developing countries are not taking into consideration the welfare of their citizens 
in designing their policies or welfare of society has not been weighted much in designing trade policies. In other 
words, following Grossman Helpmen theoretical structure, it means that these governments are giving more 
weights to the interests of political parties which gets political contributions from different lobbies in the 
economy.  
Qualitative Analysis: 
The results of study are supportive to the real world scenario both qualitatively as well. . Qualitatively in a sense 
that for democratic nations, values of the parameter “a” are larger and significant country wise and panel wise as 
well while for autocratic nations these values are small in magnitude and insignificant for many Middle East 
nations where it can be observed that one man rule is there mostly. And powers are concentrated in few hands 
and these few try to promote their own special interests. Similarly political systems in different regimes are 
showing the same trend which the theories prove. In many developing countries, parliamentary democracies 
seems to be more welfare oriented than presidential democracies19. Moreover this value is even more higher 
which are rich democracies. It means income levels matters a lot in taking step regarding some policy decision. 
While the trend for both types of autocracy is mix but mostly showing no effective contribution in raising 
welfare of the society. Overall for most autocratic nations, either the values are insignificant or very small. Only 
for those autocratic nations the value of parameter is larger which are rich nations. So in this way it can be 
concluded  that more rich nations are more welfare minded than poor. It also means that all these factors are 
complementary for each other for governments. And to be democratic or autocratic is not only some very 
important rather the systems through which these systems are being controlled and their income levels also 
matters a lot.   
Quantitative Analysis: 
On the other hand, results are also in line with the present trends of openness or protection policies of nations. 
For example, nations having high tariff rates have lower value of welfare mindedness parameter. Example of 
these nations are Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Ethopia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgistan and Mongolia while more open 
countries or countries with lower tariff rates like Singapore, Pakistan, India, Kazakistan, Malaysia, Korea, 
Thialand, Turkey, Ukrain20 are having high values of this parameter which means that if nations are moving 
towards free trade policies then it means these governments are becoming more welfare concerned. Moreover 
again an attempt has been made to observe the effect of lobby formation in an economy. This is being done 
through taking into consideration the role of vertical linkages in trade. These vertical linkages actually helps in 
intra firm trade and promotes vertical integration. But to pressurize governments by these few industries can 
affect the interests of other industries badly. It can be seen from the results that welfare estimates are showing 
mostly negative values which means that lobby formation affects badly the designing process of policies. 
Moreover the effect of lobby formation is same in any case either democracy or autocracy, rich or poor and 
presidential or parliamentary system. Our results are supporting for few nations in a recent study21. Not much 
                                                 
18
 Alt and Gilgen(1994) found that domestic institutions also matters while deciding about trade policy and trade    
    coalitions.  
19
 See for detail, The perils of presidentialism’ and ‘The virtues of parliamentarism’ by Jaun J. Linz(1990) 
20
 To gain more knowledge in terms of quantitative policy effects (Tariff policy), Trade Policy Reviews issued by WTO has 
been used.  
21
 See Gawande. Krishna and olarreaga(2011) 
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examples by various authors are present in literature for this type of analysis. And the quoted study is also a mix 
panel of different developed and developing nations. But this study has tied to use this Grossman Helpman 
model for purely developing nations and keeping in view many characteristics of this region in knowing whether 
these governments gives more weights to aggregate welfare of the society or patronize the welfare or special 
interests of politicians.  
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